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I. Introduction 
In context, corporate law is often credited with creating, 
hewing to, or reinforcing a shareholder wealth maximization 
norm1: “A business corporation is organized and carried on 
                                                                                                     
 *  Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee 
College of Law. New York University School of Law, J.D. 1985; Brown 
University, A.B. 1982. Work on this paper was funded in part by a summer 
research stipend provided by The University of Tennessee College of Law. Like 
so many others, I am indebted to Lyman Johnson and David Millon for creating 
a rich body of scholarship on which we all can rely and with which we can 
engage. This Essay is designed to honor and celebrate that scholarly legacy. 
 1.  A norm may be narrowly defined as “a rule that is neither promulgated 
by an official source, such as a court or legislature, nor enforced by the threat of 
legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied with.” JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 32–33 (2008) (quoting Richard 
A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. 
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primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”2 Commentators from 
the academy (law and business) and practice (lawyers and judges) 
have taken various views on this asserted norm—ranging from 
characterizing the norm as nonexistent or oversimplified to 
maintaining it as simple fact.3 This Essay contributes to the 
ongoing discussion by engaging key components of the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm principally as a matter of 
firm-level corporate governance—the point at which applicable 
corporate governance law theory, policy, and doctrine intersect 
with a firm’s organic documents (e.g., for a corporation, its 
charter and bylaws) and, more generally, corporate governance 
                                                                                                     
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 365, 365 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
This essay uses the term “norm” to signify a dominant or accepted behavioral 
standard applicable in a particular context.  See, e.g., Stephen D. 
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) 
(defining norms as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations,”); Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: 
Liberating the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1174–75 (2006) 
(“[D]efin[ing] a norm as a standard of conduct or purported standard of conduct 
that (1) is of a type which has existence conditions that refer in some fairly 
direct way to facts about human behavior, attitudes, or beliefs, or to some 
combination of such facts, and that (2) does in fact exist because the appropriate 
existence conditions have been met . . . .”). 
 2. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (2010) (“Having chosen a 
for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary 
duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting 
to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”). I 
note at the outset that the text of this essay uses the term “shareholder” rather 
than “stockholder” except when quoting from the work of others, even though 
Delaware statutory and decisional corporate law generally uses the term 
“stockholder.” 
 3. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 29 
(2012) (denying the existence of a pervasive shareholder wealth maximization 
norm); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the 
Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 45 (2002) (describing the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm as “well-established in U.S. corporate law” and 
treating it “as given”); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After 
Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10–15 (2015) (surveying academic literature on 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm and concluding that there is none); 
Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its 
Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 393–99 (2014) 
(describing shareholder wealth maximization as a norm of corporate governance 
and an objective of corporate law). 
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law practice. Relatively few commentators approach analyses of 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm from this perspective.  
Much of the debate over a shareholder wealth maximization 
norm focuses on theory and policy, while acknowledging and 
analyzing legal doctrine. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, given the 
relationship between legal doctrine and norms in the corporate 
law context. Leaving aside governance rules embedded in federal 
and state securities law (primarily applicable to publicly traded 
companies) and generally applicable common law, state corporate 
law—statutory and decisional—directly or indirectly supplies the 
legal rules for U.S. corporate governance.4 While corporate law 
statutory rules may, in fact, also represent or codify norms, 
decisional law often relies on theory and policy to fill gaps in 
meaning. Thus, theory and policy may “push” the law in 
individual settings one way or another when the issue is 
perceived to be one of first impression or otherwise creates legal 
uncertainty. 
Moreover, much of the existing work on the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm focuses on the Delaware law 
governing publicly held corporations.5 Again, this is somewhat 
                                                                                                     
 4. I write “directly or indirectly” to indicate that corporate law allows for 
private ordering through, e.g., corporate charters, bylaws, and shareholder 
agreements. See, e.g., Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its 
Limits in the Delaware General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 845–
46 (2008). 
[M]ore than fifty-five years ago, in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the stock-holders of a 
Delaware corporation had broad power to include provisions in the 
certificate of incorporation departing from the rules of the common 
law and many sections of the DGCL. Indeed, Professor Folk noted 
almost forty years ago that “the Delaware corporation enjoys the 
broadest grant of power in the English-speaking world to establish 
the most appropriate internal organization and structure for the 
enterprise.”  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 5. Many authors expressly acknowledge the strength of the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm in Delaware judicial opinions or under Delaware 
corporate law generally and in the public company context.  See, e.g., Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A 
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1424–25 (1993) (“At 
least in Delaware, the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . remains a 
more accurate description of the state of the law than any of its competitors.”); 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (1999) (noting, as one of “two recurring themes 
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unremarkable. Delaware enjoys the largest number of 
incorporations and most publicly traded companies are organized 
under Delaware law, making its law highly significant.6  
Critiques of the shareholder wealth maximization norm also 
often view corporate governance rules on a generic macro level—
from a broad-based, state-oriented doctrinal viewpoint.7 Yet, 
corporate governance also can be viewed from the more narrow 
perspective of an individual state’s legal doctrine (i.e., through a 
particular state’s legislative and judicial rules only)8 or at the 
firm level (taking into account the effects of permitted private 
ordering, as well as statutory and decisional law, in a specific 
identified firm).9 For practitioners engaged in incorporating new 
                                                                                                     
in the literature: . . . that the primary goal of the public corporation is—or ought 
to be—maximizing shareholders' wealth.”); David Millon, Radical Shareholder 
Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1035–36 (2013) (describing the 
relationship between Delaware corporate law and the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm). 
 6. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted 
Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 869 (2016) (“Today, 64% of the Fortune 500 
companies are incorporated in Delaware, as are more than half of all companies 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and other major stock 
exchanges.”); Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate 
Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 75 (2015) (observing that Delaware “can be 
thought of as the home of corporate America, with two-thirds of U.S. public 
companies being incorporated under Delaware corporate law, with Delaware 
courts deciding a large proportion of major corporate law cases, and with courts 
in other states often applying Delaware case law”); Johnson & Millon, supra 
note 3, at 10 (describing Delaware corporate law as “the most influential body of 
law for United States publicly held corporations”). 
 7. Bernard S.F. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its 
Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 391–92 (2015). 
 8. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where 
to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 387–88 (2003) (referencing specific 
corporate governance rules under Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts law); 
Chancellor William B. Chandler III, Thoughts on the North Dakota Publicly 
Traded Corporations Act of 2007, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1051, 1051–57 (2008) (offering 
commentary on North Dakota corporate governance and the federalist approach 
to corporate law, among other things); see generally Virginia Harper Ho, Team 
Production & the Multinational Enterprise, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 499, 506 
(2015) (“U.S. state law, whether of Delaware or another state of incorporation, 
will only govern the internal affairs of the specific entity incorporated within the 
state.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of 
Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2016) (“The critical 
characteristic of the new governance is that it reflects a structural approach to 
the balance of power between boards and shareholders. Importantly, this 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 943 
firms or modifying the internal governance of existing firms, and 
for litigators and judges involved in adjudicating controversies 
regarding the same, the private ordering implications of 
corporate law at the firm level assume paramount importance.10 
Finally, shareholder wealth maximization theory focuses 
almost exclusively on financial wealth (i.e., pecuniary gain or 
profit), as opposed to other measures of satisfaction or benefit 
derived by shareholders from their equity ownership.11 In 
addition, decisional law addressing the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm typically emphasizes the maximization of 
short-term or long-term profit or financial wealth in connection 
with an individual decision made by a corporation’s board of 
directors.12 Yet, shareholders (in particular, but not exclusively, 
                                                                                                     
structural approach has been implemented through private ordering rather 
than regulatory reform.”); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional 
Activism A Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 
174, 225 (2001) (noting that “the benefit of some corporate governance 
mechanisms vary with firm-specific characteristics”); Paul Rose, Regulating 
Risk by “Strengthening Corporate Governance”, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 11 (2010) 
(observing that “‘good’ corporate governance is firm-specific and often based on 
qualities, such as corporate culture, that are not readily quantifiable and so are 
difficult or impossible to reduce to a set of metrics.”). 
 10. See generally, e.g., George S. Geis, Ex-Ante Corporate Governance, 41 J. 
CORP. L. 609 (2016) (providing an analysis of the validity of corporate 
governance private ordering as a matter of corporate law); Joseph A. Grundfest, 
The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An 
Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333 (2012); D. Gordon Smith et al., 
Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (2011) 
(extolling the virtues of firm-level corporate governance rule-making through 
bylaw provisions); Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. 
L. REV. 485 (2016) (arguing for private ordering with respect to corporate 
governance rules relating to shareholder litigation). 
 11. See Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of 
Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 
1273, 1282–83 (1991) (“Most academics now believe that shareholder wealth 
maximization is the basic pecuniary objective of the modern publicly held 
corporation.”). 
 12. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. 
Ch. 2010) (“I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights 
Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to 
maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit 
of its stockholders . . . .”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 
1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. . . . The discretion of directors . . . does not extend . . . 
to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to 
other purposes.”). 
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shareholders in privately held firms) may desire to enhance more 
than their financial wealth through their shareholdings, and they 
may value individual board decisions that eschew one element of 
desired shareholder value in favor of another as long as the 
board’s overall management of the firm—through the exercise of 
both decision-making and oversight—prioritizes increasing 
aggregate shareholder value and benefit.13 
In an effort to broaden the conversation about the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm in an applied context, 
this Essay describes shareholder wealth maximization under 
various state laws (in and outside Delaware) as a function of 
firm-level corporate governance—corporate law statutes, 
decisional law interpreting and filling gaps in that statutory law, 
and corporate charter and bylaw provisions—as applicable to 
both publicly held and privately held corporations in a variety of 
states.14 In this overall context, the Essay considers the 
possibility that holders of shares in for-profit corporations may 
desire to maximize overall utility in their shareholdings of a 
particular firm, rather than merely the financial wealth arising 
from those holdings. To accomplish its purpose, the Essay first 
briefly and generally addresses shareholder wealth maximization 
as a function of applicable statutory and decisional law and as a 
matter of private ordering (collecting, synthesizing, and 
characterizing, in each case, points made in the extant literature) 
before suggesting the broad implications of that analysis for 
corporate governance and shareholder wealth maximization and 
concluding. 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value 
and the Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 41 (2015) 
(noting that “there is strong evidence that shareholders sacrifice their financial 
interests to promote their nonfinancial interests. If shareholders do not want 
pure profit maximization, the shareholder wealth maximization norm loses 
much of its theoretical support”). 
 14. Delaware law and the ABA’s Model Business Corporation Act are 
primary touchstones because of their overall importance to U.S. corporate law. 
Moreover, because I am licensed to practice in Tennessee and serve as a 
member of the Tennessee Bar Association Business Law Section Executive 
Committee, I will cite to and quote from Tennessee law with some significance 
throughout the Essay—with more frequency than, but not to the exclusion of, 
the law of other states. 
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II. Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Matter of Statutory 
Corporate Law 
Corporate law statutes relate to shareholder wealth 
maximization from several different perspectives. The contexts in 
which corporate wealth maximization questions arise include 
charter provisions on firm-level corporate purpose, director and 
officer standards of conduct in managing the business of the 
corporation, and stakeholder statutes. The succeeding 
paragraphs address each in turn. 
State corporate law statutes articulate mandatory and 
permissive provisions for inclusion in a corporation’s chartering 
document—e.g., a certificate of incorporation in Delaware, 
articles of incorporation in most Model Business Corporation Act 
(“MBCA”) states, and a charter in Tennessee.15 These provisions 
typically constrain corporations to exist for lawful purposes.16 The 
most unusual provision I have come across to date in this area of 
the law is the California provision on chartered corporate 
purpose, which reads in pertinent part as follows: 
                                                                                                     
 15.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2015) (mandating that the 
nature or purposes of the business be stated in the certificate of incorporation); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(2)(A) (2016) (providing that “[t]he charter may 
set forth: [p]rovisions not inconsistent with law: . . . [s]tating the purpose or 
purposes for which the corporation is organized”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 2.02(b)(2)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006) (stating that “[t]he articles of incorporation 
may set forth: . . . provisions not inconsistent with law regarding: the purpose or 
purposes for which the corporation is organized . . .”). 
 16. Delaware law, for example, provides that  
The certificate of incorporation shall set forth the nature of the 
business or purposes to be conducted or promoted. It shall be 
sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, 
that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or 
activity for which corporations may be organized under the General 
Corporation Law of Delaware, and by such statement all lawful acts 
and activities shall be within the purposes of the corporation, except 
for express limitations, if any . . . . 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2015). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-13-
101(a) (2016) (“Every corporation incorporated under chapters 11–27 of this title 
has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited 
purpose is set forth in the charter.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2006) (“Every corporation incorporated under this Act has the purpose of 
engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the 
articles of incorporation.”). 
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The articles of incorporation shall set forth: 
 (b)(1) The applicable one of the following statements: 
(A) The purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful 
act or activity for which a corporation may be organized under 
the General Corporation Law of California other than the 
banking business, the trust company business or the practice 
of a profession permitted to be incorporated by the California 
Corporations Code; or 
(B) The purpose of the corporation is to engage in the 
profession of ___ (with the insertion of a profession permitted 
to be incorporated by the California Corporations Code) and 
any other lawful activities (other than the banking or trust 
company business) not prohibited to a corporation engaging in 
such profession by applicable laws and regulations.17 
This California statute appears to mandate one of two express 
formulations of corporate purpose without allowing any variance 
from the form of the statement presented (other than filling in a 
blank). California’s corporate law also allows for optional charter 
provisions, one of which allows for the charter to include “[a]ny 
other provision, not in conflict with law, for the management of 
the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, 
including any provision which is required or permitted by this 
division to be stated in the bylaws.”18 These state statutory 
provisions on corporate charters, even with their differences, do 
not mandate or expressly invoke an emphasis on shareholder 
wealth maximization or even shareholder value or primacy. 
State corporate laws in the United States provide that the 
board of directors of the corporation manages or directs the 
management of the firm by default (absent charter provisions or 
other expressly permitted private ordering to the contrary)19 and 
                                                                                                     
 17. CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(b)(1) (West 2015). 
 18. Id.§ 204(d). 
 19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (“The business and 
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided 
in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-
101(b) (2016) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority 
of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction 
of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the charter.”). The 
Model Business Corporation Act similarly provides as follows: 
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of 
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that officers, typically key agents of the firm appointed by the 
board of directors, have subsidiary management responsibilities 
typically delegated to them by the board or in the corporation’s 
bylaws.20 Although the General Corporation Law of the State of 
Delaware (DGCL) does not supply express behavioral guidance 
applicable to director and officer management activities, the 
MBCA and states adopting its framework for their corporate law 
do include standards of conduct for directors and officers.21 These 
                                                                                                     
the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs 
of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and 
subject to the oversight, of its board of directors, subject to any 
limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement 
authorized under section 7.32. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006). 
 20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2016) (“Every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties 
as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which 
is not inconsistent with the bylaws. . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-18-401(a) 
(2016) (“A corporation has the officers described in its bylaws or designated by 
its board of directors in accordance with the bylaws. Unless the charter or 
bylaws provide otherwise, officers shall be elected or appointed by the board of 
directors.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006) (“A 
corporation has the officers described in its bylaws or appointed by the board of 
directors in accordance with the bylaws.”).  Tennessee law further provides that 
[e]ach officer has the authority and shall perform the duties set forth 
in the bylaws or, to the extent consistent with the bylaws, the duties 
prescribed by the board of directors or by direction of an officer 
authorized by the board of directors to prescribe the duties of other 
officers. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-402 (2016). Along the same lines, the Model Business 
Corporation Act provides that  
[e[ach officer has the authority and shall perform the functions set 
forth in the bylaws or, to the extent consistent with the bylaws, the 
functions prescribed by the board of directors or by direction of an 
officer authorized by the board of directors to prescribe the functions 
of other officers. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.41 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006). 
 21. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301(a) (2016) (“A director shall 
discharge all duties as director . . . (1) In good faith; (2) With the care an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances; and (3) In a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of the corporation.”); id. § 48-18-403(a) (“An officer . . . shall 
discharge all duties under that authority: (1) In good faith; (2) With the care an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances; and (3) In a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the 
best interest of the corporation.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2006) (“Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the 
948 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939 (2017) 
standards prescribe that actions be taken in good faith, with due 
care, and in the best interest of the corporation.22 Yet, none of 
these statutory frameworks regarding officer and director 
management or conduct mention—no less require—management 
action in a manner that maximizes shareholder wealth or value 
or compels shareholder primacy.23  
In fact, a significant number of states have adopted “other 
constituency” legislation—statutes that emphasize management’s 
ability to consider the effects of corporate action on a variety of 
stakeholders. Almost twenty years ago, Professor Gordon Smith 
succinctly described the history and then current state of the law 
in this regard as follows: 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many corporations adopted 
charter amendments allowing managers greater discretion to 
consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies in the 
context of a corporate takeover. In 1983, Pennsylvania adopted 
the first nonshareholder constituency statute, which allowed 
managers, “in considering the best interests of the corporation, 
to consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers, 
and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices 
or other establishments of the corporation are located, and all 
other pertinent factors.” Nonshareholder constituency statutes 
have now been adopted in over half of the states . . . .24 
                                                                                                     
duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”); id. § 8.42(a) 
(“An officer . . . has the duty to act: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care that a 
person in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances; 
and (3) in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of 
the corporation.”). 
 22. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 23. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Non-Shareholder Constituency 
Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 990 (1992) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Interpreting] 
(“This is not to say that the statutes codify shareholder wealth maximization as 
the sole, or even the principal, guiding norm of corporate decision-making. To 
the contrary, the statutes do modify shareholder wealth’s traditional position at 
the top of the corporation’s list of priorities.”); Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in 
Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 
282 (2013) (“[N]o corporate statute states that a corporation must maximize 
profits or shareholder wealth.”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 10 
(“Delaware corporate law . . . does not mandate shareholder wealth 
maximization. The statute says no such thing.”); Sharfman, supra note 3, at 398 
(“Delaware General Corporation Law is silent on shareholder wealth 
maximization.”). 
 24. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 949 
This aspect of statutory corporate law has changed little since 
Professor Smith wrote these words.25 Neither the DGCL nor the 
MBCA includes other constituency provisions.26 Although other 
constituency statutes do not deny the existence of a shareholder 
wealth maximization norm in director and officer action that 
complies with applicable fiduciary duties, they do offer corporate 
managers some cover in considering the interests of other 
stakeholders when they engage in management activities.27 
Of course, the lack of positive statutory law dictating 
shareholder wealth maximization does not signal the lack of a 
norm (as opposed to a doctrinal rule or legal requirement 
embedded in director and officer fiduciary duties).28 One could 
                                                                                                     
289 (1998). 
 25. See Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders 
Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 93–98 (2015) (relating the history 
and components of constituency statutes throughout the United States). 
 26. See id. at 97 (“Neither Delaware nor the ABA Model Business 
Corporation Act, both leaders in corporate legislation, have adopted non-
shareholder constituency language.”). 
 27. See Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency 
Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 787 (“In other words, constituency statutes at least make 
clear that a board of directors may consider interests other than those of the 
shareholders when making corporate decisions.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business 
Judgment Rule, (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2, 4) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888052 (“The requirement of SWM enters into 
corporate law through a Board’s fiduciary duties as applied under the Rule, not 
statutory law.”) (on file with author); Smith, supra note 24, at 290 (“Even if the 
shareholder primacy norm is unenforceable as a rule of law, it still may 
influence corporate decision making. As noted above, the influence of the 
shareholder primacy norm on ordinary business decisions is an empirical 
question not susceptible to a ready answer.”). One academic commentator 
articulates the strength of a social, rather than legal, shareholder wealth 
maximization norm in director conduct: 
[E]ven if the strong shareholder wealth-maximization language from 
Dodge, the ALI Principles, and eBay do not state enforceable legal 
requirements, the principle appears to be a widely shared norm 
among corporate directors. That is, even if the revisionists were 
correct on the law, it would still be the case that corporate directors 
are overwhelmingly primed to pursue shareholder wealth. That norm 
is prevalent in business schools, law schools, corporate social circles, 
and corporate boardrooms. Even the most ardent critics of the norm, 
moreover, acknowledge its prevalence in U.S. businesses. Corporate 
directors, in other words, are taught to believe in both the legal 
requirement and the normative desirability of shareholder wealth-
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argue that benefit corporation statutes, which typically do not 
permit the corporation’s board to prioritize shareholder wealth 
over other corporate interests, have become popular largely 
because of concern that a shareholder wealth maximization norm 
does exist (even in states with other constituency statutes) or 
may interfere with the board’s ability to consider corporate 
interests other than the enhancement of shareholder financial 
wealth.29 Decisional law offers some evidence of why this concern 
about a norm exists, even if the evidence may not permit a form 
conclusion that the norm has been codified as legal doctrine.30 
III. Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Matter of Decisional 
Law 
The list of judicial decisions that support corporate 
shareholder wealth maximization is short and has been well trod 
in the literature. Typically, summaries of the court opinions in 
this area begin with the iconic early twentieth-century Michigan 
                                                                                                     
maximization. These social norms can be at least as powerful an 
influence on director behavior as legal doctrine, and they have had an 
enormous impact on the way that directors view their role within 
corporations. 
James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1598–
99 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
 29. See William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit 
Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 838 (2012) (“[B]enefit corporation statutes . . . address 
not only the need for a new corporate form that changes the paradigm of 
shareholder primacy, but also respond to the demand . . . for a corporate form 
that meets the needs and expectations of increasingly socially and 
environmentally conscious consumers, investors, and entrepreneurs.”); Joan 
MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding for-Profit Social 
Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 302–04 (2013) (observing that benefit 
corporations and other social enterprise forms of entity are, in part, a reaction to 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm); J. Haskell Murray, Defending 
Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 485, 489 (2013) [hereinafter Murray, Defending Patagonia] (“According 
to their proponents, the benefit corporation statutes combat the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm that they claim is mandated by traditional corporate 
law.”); Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American 
Corporations, 71 BUS. LAW. 381, 386 (2016) (“Benefit corporations are a 
contemporary effort to permit other participants to limit the reach of 
shareholder primacy in corporations.”). 
 30. See generally infra Part III. 
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case Dodge v. Ford Motor Company31 and extend through eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,32 sometimes stopping along 
the way to note other cases, including Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holdings, Inc.33 and its progeny, and perhaps another 
case or two, like Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.34 Observers often cite 
to the judicial opinions in these cases to support the existence of a 
shareholder wealth maximization norm.35 Rather than re-telling 
the entire story of these court opinions, this Essay notes a few 
salient observations about them as embodiments of a possible 
legal obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. 
A number of prominent commentators acknowledge that 
none of this decisional law—not even the seminal, foundational 
Dodge opinion—substantiates an enforceable, judicially imposed 
legal obligation to maximize shareholder financial wealth in 
ordinary-course decision-making.36 As Professor Lyman Johnson 
                                                                                                     
 31. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  In a recent article, Professor George 
Mocsary notes that “Dodge’s view of shareholders as the corporation’s residual 
claimants to whom the directors owe a duty of wealth maximization was a 
succinct restatement of the preceding several decades of Michigan common law. 
George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1319, 
1344 (2016). 
 32. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). Despite the fact that the eBay opinion is a 
trial court opinion un-reviewed by an appellate court, it has assumed 
exceptional significance in contemporary conceptions of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm under Delaware law because it is one of few recent cases to 
address director decision making in that context. 
 33. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 34. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. 1986). Another recent Delaware court opinion 
reference the primacy of shareholder interests and the preservation of corporate 
value for shareholders without enunciating or applying a shareholder wealth 
maximization norm.  See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36 
(Del. Ch. 2013) (“When exercising their statutory responsibility, the standard of 
conduct requires that directors seek ‘to promote the value of the corporation for 
the benefit of its stockholders.’”); id. at 37 (“[D]irectors owe duties to the 
corporation for the ultimate benefit of the entity's residual claimants.”). 
35. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in 
the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 47–48 (2002); Sharfman, supra 
note 28, at 31–33; David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 187–94 (2013). 
 36. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 775 (2005) (“[E]ven Dodge, the high-water mark 
for the supposed duty to profit-maximize, indicates that no such enforceable 
duty exists.”); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, 
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 
(2012) [hereinafter Murray, Choosing] (“Even though they may disagree on why, 
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points out, this is unsurprising given the circumscribed role that 
the judiciary plays in adjudicating fiduciary duty cases in which 
the issue arises: 
Judges address only the particular claims and desired relief 
that are brought before them. They cannot and do not 
mandate that governing officials maximize shareholder 
wealth. They can only prohibit them from taking 
particularized actions. In Dodge, the plaintiffs sought more 
dividends. In eBay, the plaintiffs sought the nullification of 
certain anti-takeover measures. Neither plaintiff sought an 
injunction or other remedy that would have prohibited 
directors from pursuing the criticized business strategy, and 
neither the Dodge nor the eBay court altered corporate 
strategy. For judges who routinely recite the vaunted business 
judgment rule, moreover, one core rationale for which is that 
directors, not judges, govern corporations, the granting of such 
extraordinary and meddlesome relief would seem quite 
unlikely.37 
When viewed through this judicial authority lens, one can 
understand the observations of scholars and others about the lack 
of a coherent legal rule, as well as the paucity of the decisional 
law referencing shareholder wealth maximization and the 
somewhat scattered, fact-based contexts in which a shareholder 
wealth maximization rationale is judicially employed. 
Adding to the complexity is some doctrinal confusion—or 
perhaps just a lack of clear expression—in decisional law about 
the institution or constituencies to which or whom director and 
office fiduciary duties are owed. Some decisional law describes 
fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and other court opinions 
refer to duties owed to the corporation and its shareholders. 
Although anecdotal observation reveals that the latter cases may 
predominate more in change-of-control settings (where 
shareholder value primacy plays a more leading role),38 the 
                                                                                                     
commenters appear to agree that the Dodge court’s ordering of directors to act in 
favor of shareholders (in the day-to-day context) is a rare outcome.”); Murray, 
Defending Patagonia, supra note 29, at 489 (“In practice, except in a small 
handful of cases—Dodge v. Ford, Revlon, and eBay v. Newmark—courts very 
rarely enforce shareholder wealth maximization.”). 
 37. Johnson, supra note 23, at 285–86 (footnotes omitted). 
 38. See Johnson, supra note 23, 286 (“[O]nly when the demise of the 
corporation is at hand or control over its direction shifts away from dispersed 
shareholders does stockholder wealth become the sole purpose.”); Murray, 
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shareholder beneficiary language also occurs in other settings.39 
For example, in a leading case on director fiduciary duties 
relating to decisions made in the zone of insolvency, the Delaware 
Supreme Court articulated the beneficiary of the duties both 
ways in separate parts of its opinion.40 In a recent case involving 
a challenge to a merger transaction, Vice Chancellor Travis 
Laster explained his understanding of the manner in which a 
corporation’s directors may be seen to owe their duties to both the 
corporation and its shareholders: 
[B]y increasing the value of the corporation, the directors 
increase the share of value available for the residual 
claimants. Judicial opinions therefore often refer to directors 
owing fiduciary duties “to the corporation and its 
shareholders.” This formulation captures the foundational 
relationship in which directors owe duties to the corporation 
for the ultimate benefit of the entity’s residual claimants. 
Nevertheless, “stockholders’ best interest must always, within 
legal limits, be the end. Other constituencies may be 
considered only instrumentally to advance that end.”41 
This formulation offers a bit more clarity than most judicial 
opinions on the subject, articulating a shareholder primacy 
                                                                                                     
Defending Patagonia, supra note 29, at 489 (noting that “the takeover cases play 
a prominent role” in judicial enforcement of a shareholder wealth maximization 
norm). 
 39. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. 
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007) (adjudicating a creditor’s right to a 
derivative action when a corporation is in the zone of insolvency); Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 509 (resolving a corporate opportunity claim). 
 40. Compare Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 99, 101 (“It is well established 
that . . . directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its 
shareholders [and] . . . must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the 
corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the 
best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”), with 
id. at 101 (asserting that “[i]t is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties 
to the corporation.”). See also Guth, 5 A.2d at 509–10, referring to “the 
principles governing officers and directors of a corporation with respect to their 
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders” and affirming that 
“[c]orporate officers and directors . . . stand in a fiduciary relation to the 
corporation and its stockholders,” but proceeding with an analysis that 
references obligations to the corporation only—“undivided and unselfish loyalty 
to the corporation” and “the general rule that demands of an officer or director 
the utmost good faith in his relation to the corporation which he represents.” 
 41. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(citations and footnotes omitted). 
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objective as a focus for the directors’ management of the firm as 
fiduciaries. 
Thus, the cases in most published accounts that directly 
address shareholder wealth maximization are a dispersed lot that 
address specific facts in markedly different decision-making 
contexts in two principal jurisdictions—Michigan42 and 
Delaware.43 To derive a single, broadly applicable norm or rule of 
law on shareholder wealth maximization from these decisions 
likely would be reckless. For instance, other state laws bear some 
scrutiny before such a task should be undertaken. I note for 
example that a Tennessee Court of Appeals case avers: 
As a fiduciary, the officer or director has a strong influence on 
how the corporation conducts its affairs, and a correspondingly 
strong duty not to conduct those affairs to the unfair detriment 
of others, such as minority shareholders or creditors, who also 
have legitimate interests in the corporation but lack the power 
of the fiduciary.44 
Tennessee decisional law (federal and state) also variously states 
to what or to whom fiduciary duties are owed.45 Other state law 
judicial opinions vary. A New York case provides that “directors 
and officers are bound by their duty of undivided and unqualified 
loyalty to their corporations, a duty which encompasses good 
faith efforts to insure that their personal profit is not at the 
expense of their corporations.”46 This seems to be a relatively 
consistent formulation in New York decisional law, with a 
Westlaw search conducted on December 4, 2016, revealing only 
                                                                                                     
 42. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919). 
 43. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 44. Intertherm, Inc. v. Olympic Homes Sys., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 467, 471 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). 
 45. See, e.g., May v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 387 F. Supp. 2d 770, 779 
(W.D. Tenn. 2004) (“[A] director . . . of the corporation must act in good faith and 
remain loyal to the corporation and its shareholders.”); State ex rel. Oliver v. 
Soc’y for the Pres. of Book of Common Prayer, 693 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tenn. 1985) 
(“A director of a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to its 
members or shareholders.”); Franklin Capital Associates, L.P. v. Almost Family, 
Inc., 194 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he duty of care required of 
directors and officers is to act in good-faith and in the best interest of the 
corporation [w]ith the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
exercise under similar circumstances . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 46. Limmer v. Medallion Grp., Inc., 75 A.D.2d 299, 303 (N.Y. 1980). 
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six cases of the sixty-two located (in a search for New York cases 
with the term “fiduciary duties” within five words of “to the 
corporation”) in which a duty to security holders was mentioned 
in addition to a duty to the corporation. The same search 
conducted on the same day of California decisional law yielded 
more varied results. Of course, unexplored differences in the 
underlying statutory law in New York and California may 
contribute to these variances. 
Finally, it bears noting that most formulations of the 
business judgment rule refer to director and officer actions being 
taken in the best interest of the corporation. Delaware’s seminal 
case in this regard, Aronson v. Lewis,47 is no exception, providing 
that the business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making 
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”48 
Tennessee law is in accord.49 The omission of a reference to the 
best interest of shareholders has salience, especially in a 
jurisdiction without a decision (like Dodge under Michigan law or 
Ebay under Delaware law) that codifies or signals a shareholder 
wealth maximization requirement.   
Overall, based on the evidence summarized in this part of the 
Essay, it would be over-claiming to assert that U.S. state 
decisional law—any more than U.S. state statutory law—
articulates a clear, legally enforceable shareholder wealth 
maximization norm as a matter of substantive corporate doctrine. 
Yet, as Professor Haskell Murray notes: 
Despite all of the academic debate, the persistent common 
perception seems to be that directorial duties require placing 
shareholder wealth at the forefront. The perception may stem 
from the pronouncements of courts in Dodge and eBay, from 
various academic articles, from education in business and law 
schools, and from the popular media. The perception—as the 
                                                                                                     
 47. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (overruled in other respects by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)). 
 48. Id. at 812. 
 49. See Franklin Capital, 194 S.W.3d at 399–400 (“The business judgment 
rule, when it applies, provides ‘a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors [and officers] of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interest of the company.’” (citations omitted)). 
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phrase “shareholder wealth maximization norm” suggests—
has arguably risen to the level of a widely recognized and 
influential norm.50 
That norm, when layered onto statutory and decisional law that 
does not foreclose its existence or power, influences the practice of 
corporate law in very direct ways. Of course, it impacts the advice 
that a lawyer gives to a corporate client when the client’s board is 
meeting to engage in decision making or oversight. But a 
shareholder wealth maximization norm also impacts choice of 
entity, corporate formation, and legal counsel on potential 
amendments to corporate organic documents—most especially 
corporate charters.51 The next part of the Essay focuses on this 
aspect of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 
IV. Shareholder Wealth Management as a Matter of Corporate 
Organic Documents  
A number of important questions emerge at the intersection 
of the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the terms and 
provisions of corporate organizational documents. Among them 
are the following: 
 To the extent business promoters or managers desire to 
establish or clarify the nature of a corporation’s purpose in 
its charter at or after formation in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm, will that charter provision be legally valid?  
 If so, may directors rely on that chartered purpose in 
exercising their fiduciary duties to the corporation or will 
a court fail to give effect to the charter provision in that 
context? 
 What role may corporate bylaws (as well as shareholder 
                                                                                                     
 50. Murray, Choosing, supra note 36, at 17–18 (footnote omitted). 
 51. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as 
Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 295 (2015) 
[D]ecisions such as eBay and Trados . . . are in tension with long-standing 
doctrine . . . . As doctrinal innovations, these decisions risk undermining 
the utility of the corporate form as a vehicle for maximizing firm value, 
potentially inducing investors and entrepreneurs to turn to noncorporate 
entities to finance new business enterprises or deterring investment 
altogether. 
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agreements and publicized board policies) play in 
addressing undesired effects of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm in a particular corporation’s 
governance? 
This part of the Essay undertakes to briefly address these 
questions, which interact with each other. 
As noted in Part II, state law provisions governing corporate 
charters typically allow for a corporation to include in its charter 
a statement of corporate purpose as long as that purpose is 
lawful.52 Moreover, Part II notes that the authority of the board 
of directors to manage the corporation can be modified by 
provision in a corporate charter.53 Accordingly, a charter 
provision that is inconsistent with the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm should be valid unless that provision 
establishes an unlawful purpose.54 Is a statement of purpose that 
contradicts the shareholder wealth maximization norm lawful? 
An easy answer to that question, given the evidence 
presented above in Parts II and III, would be that the provision is 
lawful because no positive law mandates the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm.55 Indeed, there is support for that conclusion 
                                                                                                     
 52. Supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text  
 53. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 54. It is worth noting at this juncture that many corporations operating 
under general purpose charter provisions explicitly operate in a manner that 
may be seen as contradictory to the shareholder wealth maximization norm. See 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1165 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d 
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Briscoe, 
C.J., dissenting) (observing, after noting the credit given by the majority opinion 
to the religious missions of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc., that in 
“[t]he certificates of incorporation for both Hobby Lobby and Mardel . . . there is 
not a single reference to religion”). Instead, the certificates state simply that 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel were created for the purpose of “‘engag[ing] in any 
lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the 
OKLAHOMA GENERAL CORPORATION ACT.’” Id. See also Jessica Chu, Note, Filling 
a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 173 (2012) (“[A]n analysis of 
corporate behavior indicates that corporations with general-purpose statements, 
regardless of the state of incorporation, are not restricted to only activities that 
maximize shareholder wealth.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate 
Objectives, and the Corporate Governance Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 242 
n.192 (2015) (“While the shareholder wealth maximization language of eBay 
Domestic Holdings is quite strong, nothing in the case expressly rejects the 
contractarian argument that this objective is still only a default position that 
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in decisional law.56 Professor David Yosifon takes on this issue in 
a recently published law review article, citing to that decisional 
law (among other things). After expressing his view that 
shareholder primacy constitutes a common law rule in Delaware, 
Professor Yosifon concludes as follows: 
The Delaware common law that has established shareholder 
primacy as the default governance rule for business 
corporations neither states nor implies any public policy 
indicating that the rule should be unalterable by charter 
provision. Neither does there seem to be a clearly implied 
policy of the General Corporation Law to prohibit alteration of 
the shareholder primacy rule in firm governance.57 
While this Essay disagrees with Professor Yosifon’s conclusion to 
the extent that shareholder primacy compels shareholder wealth 
maximization, Professor Yosifon’s assessment on the validity of 
private ordering merits credit here.  
Moreover, corporations have, in the past (during the takeover 
heyday of the mid-1980s), “adopted charter provisions specifying 
management’s right to consider the interests of nonshareholder 
constituencies.”58 More recently, it was widely publicized that 
Google set up a for-profit social business corporation, Google.org, 
to conduct activities focused on attaining social objectives rather 
than shareholder wealth maximization.59 Having said that, 
                                                                                                     
can be expressly modified by the parties.”). 
 56. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952) (“[T]he 
stockholders of a Delaware corporation may by contract embody in the charter a 
provision departing from the rules of the common law, provided that it does not 
transgress a statutory enactment or a public policy settled by the common law 
or implicit in the General Corporation Law itself.”). 
 57. David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public 
Benefit Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 479 (2017) (footnote 
omitted). 
 58. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance 
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 41 (1987); see also Morey W. McDaniel, 
Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 442 (1986) (“A few 
corporations have . . . amended their articles of incorporation to provide that 
directors not only may consider such nonshareholder interests, they shall 
consider such interests.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Leslie Dougherty, Putting Poverty in Museums: Strategies to 
Encourage the Creation of the For-Profit Social Business, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 357, 372–73 (2009); see also Shruti Rana, From Making Money Without 
Doing Evil to Doing Good Without Handouts: The Google.org Experiment in 
Philanthropy, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 89 (2008) (describing Google.org and the 
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statements made in legal opinions and by jurists and academics 
in secondary resources may cast some doubt on that simple 
conclusion, at least under the Delaware law governing public 
companies. I note in particular in this regard statements made in 
and about eBay by former Delaware Chancellor William B. 
Chandler III and in a law review article written by Delaware 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine. 
Chancellor Chandler’s commentary in the eBay decision does 
not relate specifically to charter amendments, but his remarks 
may be read to indicate categorically that there is little room for 
private ordering around the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm in Delaware corporations that attract outside investment. 
Specifically, the Chancellor observes the following in commenting 
on the employment by the board of directors of craigslist, Inc. of a 
shareholder rights plan (i.e., poison pill) to protect its corporate 
culture: 
As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate about an 
organization seeking to aid local, national, and global 
communities by providing a website for online classifieds that 
is largely devoid of monetized elements. Indeed, I personally 
appreciate and admire Jim’s and Craig’s desire to be of service 
to communities. The corporate form in which craigslist 
operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely 
philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other 
stockholders interested in realizing a return on their 
investment. Jim and Craig opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a 
for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted 
millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transaction whereby 
eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit 
corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the 
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. 
Those standards include acting to promote the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after 
the company name has to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot 
accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights 
Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and 
admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-
profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders—no matter whether those stockholders are 
individuals of modest means or a corporate titan of online 
commerce. If Jim and Craig were the only stockholders 
                                                                                                     
potential accountability problems created by its structure). 
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affected by their decisions, then there would be no one to 
object. eBay, however, holds a significant stake in craigslist, 
and Jim and Craig’s actions affect others besides themselves.60 
In a recent symposium, former Chancellor Chandler reaffirmed 
and explained his opinion in the eBay case, essentially confirming 
that, to avoid liability for a breach of fiduciary duty, “a Delaware 
corporate board must place shareholder financial wealth 
(whether in the short term or the long term) ahead of any other 
value in its decision making.”61  
 Observers may wonder whether these words from the 
Chancellor in and about the eBay opinion can be taken or may be 
used to mean that a Delaware corporation must adopt any 
corporate policy or initiative that contravenes the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm ab initio or with unanimous 
shareholder approval. Proponents of the shareholder wealth 
maximization expressions in eBay certainly use the specific words 
chosen by the Chancellor in that opinion to argue that the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm is, if not legal doctrine in 
Delaware, entrenched public policy.62 A hostile judicial reaction of 
this kind to corporate private ordering is reminiscent of the 
judicial reception to shareholder agreements before statutes 
                                                                                                     
 60. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 
2010). 
 61. Joan Heminway, Berle VIII and a Delaware Law Puzzle, L. PROFESSORS 
BLOG NETWORK (July 4, 2016), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/07/berle-viii-and-a-
delaware-law-puzzle.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). See also Haskell Murray, Thoughts on the 
Berle Symposium: Doing Well by Doing Good?, L. PROFESSORS BLOG NETWORK 
(July 8, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/07/thoughts-
on-the-berle-symposium-doing-well-by-doing-good.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Anne Tucker, “Inc.” 
Means Something, L. PROFESSORS BLOG 
NETWORK (June 29, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/
06/inc-means-something.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 62. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 53 (2008) (“[T]he shareholder wealth maximization 
norm . . . indisputably is the law in the United States.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3283 (2013) (“To be 
sure, the directors are obliged to use their powers toward the end of shareholder 
wealth maximization . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 23, at 284 (discussing 
Chandler and Strine’s position that directors are under a fiduciary obligation to 
promote shareholder wealth); . 
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expressly validated them as a means of agreeing around the 
directors’ managerial authority over the corporation.63 
Chief Justice Strine’s 2015 article in the Wake Forest Law 
Review similarly reveals his view that Delaware law includes a 
common law shareholder wealth maximization norm.64 After 
constructing his argument on the meaning of Delaware’s common 
law, the Chief Justice sets out to debunk the views of 
commentators who disagree, and in the process addresses the 
possibility of a charter amendment that attempts to vary that 
common law: 
They . . . contend that stockholders are simply one 
constituency among many and that the directors are free to 
give other interests—such as the workers, consumers, the 
environment, and society as a whole—equal or even greater 
priority. In so doing, these commentators pretend that 
corporate directors do not, under corporate law of the most 
important American jurisdiction—Delaware—have to make 
stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate governance 
within the limits of their legal discretion. . . . But, the problem 
with that argument is that it does not happen to be true; it is 
inconsistent with judge-made common law of corporations in 
Delaware, as I have described. It may well be the case that a 
                                                                                                     
 63. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 486–98 (3d ed. 2016). Concerns present in 
that setting also exist in circumstances involving private ordering around the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm: 
Corporate statutes have traditionally reflected a desired symmetry, 
granting enormous power to the board while imposing corresponding 
fiduciary responsibilities of care, loyalty and good faith. However, to 
the extent boards of directors are stripped of this power by 
shareholders, the power and responsibility symmetry of the public 
policy is lost. The board’s power, and hence, control would be usurped 
without a corresponding decrease in their fiduciary responsibilities. 
Corporate governance, now out of kilter, could inevitably lead to 
organizational chaos. 
Id. at 486. Shareholder unanimity and special statutory and judicially imposed 
rules for close or closely held corporations, as well as general statutory 
provisions validating specific kinds of shareholder agreements (e.g., MBCA 
§ 7.32), have evolved the law in this area to allow for greater private ordering 
than judicial opinions earlier allowed on a consistent basis. See id. at 486–87, 
496–98. 
 64. See Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a 
Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure 
Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
761, 768–81 (2015). 
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certificate of incorporation that said that a for-profit 
corporation would put other constituencies’ interests on par 
with stockholders would, in view of § 101(b), be respected and 
supersede the corporate common law. But, in the case of 
silence, the idea that directors can subordinate stockholder 
interests to other interests of the directors’ choosing is 
strained and at odds with the structure of our overall 
statute.65 
While Chief Justice Strine gives credence to the possibility that a 
charter provision could successfully agree around the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm, his words are less than certain. 
Perhaps he is, in part, reacting to Chancellor Chandler’s strong 
language in the eBay decision about the nature of a for-profit firm 
in Delaware.  
Professor Stephen Bainbridge’s academic work in analyzing 
anti-takeover devices and non-shareholder constituency statutes 
also casts doubt on the validity of private ordering that displaces 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm,66 a norm that he 
argues is both the law and circumstantially compelled as an 
essential attribute of the for-profit corporation.67 Specifically, 
Professor Bainbridge opines on the potential invalidity of “shark 
repellents”—in effect, charter-based rejections of the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm in response to unsolicited business 
combinations—as a form of private ordering involving a 
significant alteration of the directors’ fiduciary duties. 
[S]tate law arguably does not permit corporate organic 
documents to redefine the directors’ fiduciary duties. In 
general, a charter amendment may not derogate from common 
law rules if doing so conflicts with some settled public policy. 
In light of the well-settled shareholder wealth maximization 
policy, nonmonetary factors charter amendments therefore 
appear vulnerable.68 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 782–83 (footnote omitted). 
 66. See Bainbridge, Interpreting, supra note 23, at 985 (questioning 
whether the law permits private ordering in derogation of director fiduciary 
duties and other common law rules). 
 67. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 575–77 (2003) (“[S]hareholder 
wealth maximization is not only the law, but also is a basic feature of corporate 
ideology.”). 
 68. See Bainbridge, Interpreting, supra note 23, at 985; see also Sterling v. 
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Ultimately, in response to specific proposals in derogation of the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, Professor Bainbridge 
argues that targeted regulation is the best way to counteract 
negative externalities impacting non-shareholder corporate 
constituents.69 
Two additional factors provide a cause for pause in endorsing 
the validity of charter-based private ordering relating to the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm. The first is the State of 
California’s repeated rejection of a corporate charter provision 
that included a social purpose clause, examined by Professor 
George Mocsary in a recently published account in the Brigham 
Young University Law Review.70 This rejection may be attributed 
to California’s distinct approach to corporate purpose clauses 
(noted in Part II),71 although California’s corporate statute does 
authorize a California corporation to engage in any lawful 
purpose.72 Importantly, Professor Mocsary also reports that the 
same lawyer who sought to file the California charter provision 
unsuccessfully sought a Delaware law opinion “from several 
Delaware law firms . . . stating that a charter containing a 
distinctly nonwealth purpose would be enforceable,”73 providing 
some affirmation of the uncertainty of that matter under 
                                                                                                     
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952) (“[T]he stockholders of a 
Delaware corporation may by contract embody in the charter a provision 
departing from the rules of the common law, provided that it does not transgress 
a statutory enactment or a public policy settled by the common law or implicit in 
the General Corporation Law itself.”). 
 69. See Bainbridge, supra note 67, at 591. Specifically, he concludes that: 
[T]argeted legislative approaches better alleviate the externalities 
created by corporate conduct. General welfare laws designed to deter 
wrongful corporate conduct through criminal and civil sanctions 
imposed on the corporation, its directors, and its senior officers are 
more efficient than stakeholderist tweaking of director fiduciary 
duties, which by virtue of their inherent ambiguity are a blunt 
instrument. Fiduciary duties cannot assure that specific social ills 
will be addressed by the boards of the specific corporations that are 
creating the problematic externalities. 
 70. Mocsary, supra note 31, at 1369–70. 
 71. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 72. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 206 (West 2016) (“Subject to any limitation 
contained in the articles and to compliance with any other applicable laws, any 
corporation other than a corporation subject to the Banking Law or a 
professional corporation may engage in any business activity . . . .”). 
 73. Mocsary, supra note 31 at 1370 
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Delaware corporate law. Professor Mocsary’s additional analysis, 
examples, and suggestions for implementation bear significant 
attention in this area.74 
The second additional factor that may affect the validity of 
charter-based private ordering that is determined to be 
inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm is 
the legislative adoption of benefit corporations and other 
statutory forms of social enterprise entity. The justification 
afforded to legislatures for these statutes is that they are needed 
to provide certainty to directors of for-profit corporations in their 
pursuit of social enterprise or other mission-driven objectives.75 
Accordingly, legislatures are “sold” on the existence of a 
shareholder wealth maximization norm that may not be legal 
doctrine but may, by the legislature’s tacit endorsement, become 
public policy. A student note states the issue well: 
States, by creating benefit corporations, . . .are . . . 
unnecessarily reinforcing current beliefs by establishing a 
dichotomy in which there are only two entities: (1) regular 
corporations, which cannot take into consideration social 
factors and must maximize shareholder wealth; and (2) benefit 
corporations, which can take into consideration social factors 
and do not have to maximize shareholder wealth. By 
establishing this dichotomy, states inadvertently create a 
jointly exhaustive pair in which the very existence of benefit 
corporations requires that their counterpart, a shareholder 
wealth maximizing corporation, exist. In other words, benefit 
corporations further reinforce the assumption that 
corporations exist only to make money for their 
shareholders.76 
The only saving grace, although perhaps it provides little comfort, 
is that benefit corporation statutes typically include a provision 
disclaiming any effect of benefit corporation statutes on the 
validity or interpretation of the for-profit corporate law outside 
the benefit corporation context.77 This matter is important 
                                                                                                     
 74. Id. at 1369–89.  
 75. See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. 
REV. 541, 546–48 (2016) (setting forth the arguments made in a white paper 
used to support legislative enactment of benefit corporation legislation). 
 76. Chu, supra note 54, at 185–86. 
 77. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 368 (2016) (“This subchapter shall not 
affect a statute or rule of law that is applicable to a corporation that is not a 
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because many existing social enterprise firms are organized 
under the for-profit corporation laws in states adopting benefit 
corporation statutes—either because these entities were 
incorporated before adoption of the benefit corporation provisions 
or because the firms do not want to or cannot by their nature opt 
into other aspects of the benefit corporation form. For example, 
benefit corporation statutes only cover firms with a corporate 
purpose that incorporates the specific types of statutory benefits 
listed (most often requiring that the firm have a purpose to 
benefit both the environment and society).78 Accordingly, even if 
                                                                                                     
public benefit corporation, except as provided in § 363 of this title.”); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 304A.011 (West 2016) (“The chapter does not affect a statute or 
rule of law that applies to a corporation formed under chapter 302A that is not a 
public benefit corporation.”). Tennessee law similarly, but more pointedly, 
provides in this regard that: 
[N]o implication is made by, and no inference may be drawn from, the 
enactment of this chapter as to whether, in exercising their duties, 
the officers or directors of a domestic business corporation that is not 
a for-profit benefit corporation may consider the impact of the 
corporation's transactions or other conduct on: (1) The interests of 
those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, including the 
pecuniary interests of shareholders; or (2) Any public benefit or public 
benefits identified in its charter.  
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-109 (2016). 
 78. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1702, 1706 (McKinney 2016) 
(requiring that “[e]very benefit corporation . . . have a purpose of creating 
general public benefit” and defining a general public benefit as “a material 
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed 
against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit 
corporation”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.750, 60.758 (West 2016) (providing that 
“a benefit company has the purpose of providing a general public benefit” and 
defining a general public benefit as “a material positive impact on society and 
the environment, taken as a whole, from the business and operations of a 
benefit company”). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 362(a)–(b) (2016) (requiring 
a public benefit corporation to “[i]dentify within its statement of business or 
purpose . . . 1 or more specific public benefits to be promoted by the corporation” 
and setting forth a list of specific public benefits).  Tennessee’s corporate law 
provides that 
[t]he charter of a for-profit benefit corporation shall . . . include a 
statement regarding the purpose or purposes for which the 
corporation is organized including one (1) or more public benefits to 
be pursued by the corporation” and defining a public benefit as “a 
positive effect or reduction of negative effects on one (1) or more 
categories of persons, entities, communities, or interests, other than 
shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, including, but not 
limited to, an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, 
environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific, or technological 
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it otherwise may desire to do so, not every firm that wants to look 
beyond shareholder wealth maximization for its corporate 
purpose is able to form a benefit corporation or other social 
enterprise entity because of statutory restrictions. 
The accumulated evidence is at best unclear about whether a 
public or private firm incorporated in or outside Delaware can 
engage in private ordering in its charter to include a corporate 
purpose that may be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Even assuming that 
a charter provision displacing the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm were to be determined legally valid as a 
matter of the statutory law governing charters and board 
management responsibilities, however, it may be found 
unenforceable as a matter of public policy in a specific context on 
the grounds that the shareholder wealth maximization norm—as 
Chancellor Chandler, Chief Justice Strine, and Professor 
Bainbridge, among others, assert or acknowledge—represents a 
strong public policy underlying corporate law in Delaware.79 The 
potential unenforceability of an otherwise valid charter provision 
in specific circumstances puts corporate directors in the position 
of determining that they must act in an ultra vires manner 
(potentially opening themselves up to a legal claim in that regard, 
as permitted under applicable law)80 or in bad faith—perhaps by 
violating a tacit duty of obedience81—to comply with corporate 
law or public policy giving legal effect to the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm. 
                                                                                                     
effect. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-103(3), 104(e) (2016). 
 79. See supra notes 70–80 and accompanying text (summarizing the 
arguments of these three commentators on the strong role that the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm plays in Delaware law). 
 80. Modern state corporate law statutes significantly circumscribe legal 
actions in this area. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.04(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2006) (limiting legal challenges based on a corporation’s power to act to: 
injunction proceedings by shareholders; actions by or on behalf of the 
corporation against incumbent or former director, officer, employee, or agent of 
the corporation; and enforcement proceedings brought by the state attorney 
general). 
 81. See generally Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 
55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (2010) (arguing for a revival of a duty of obedience in 
for-profit corporate law). 
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Given this uncertainty about charter-based private ordering, 
prospects for the validity and enforceability of corporate bylaws, 
shareholder agreements, and board policies also may be in doubt. 
Statutes addressing corporate bylaws generally permit 
corporations to make provision in them for internal governance of 
the firm as long as the contents are consistent with applicable 
law and the corporation’s charter.82 Yet, most statutes do not 
allow the management authority of a board of directors to be 
varied in the corporate bylaws.83 Shareholder agreements for 
firms organized under the close corporation subchapter of the 
DGCL or in an MBCA state may do a bit better in agreeing 
around the shareholder wealth maximization norm. In each case, 
agreements meeting applicable statutory requirements should be 
facially valid and enforceable to the same extent as charter 
amendments. Statutes validating shareholder agreements 
typically allow them to limit or even eliminate the board’s 
management authority,84 and the statutory provisions dictating 
                                                                                                     
 82. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2016) (“The bylaws may contain any 
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, 
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its 
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or 
employees.”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 601 (McKinney 2016) (“The by-laws may 
contain any provision relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of 
its affairs, its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its shareholders, 
directors or officers, not inconsistent with this chapter or any other statute of 
this state or the certificate of incorporation.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-106(b) 
(2016) (“The bylaws of a corporation may contain any provision for managing 
the business and regulating the affairs of the corporation that is not 
inconsistent with law or the charter.”). 
 83. Supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 84. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 350, 351 (2016) (allowing statutory 
close corporations to restrict the discretion of directors or provide for 
management by the shareholders); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-302(b) (2016) 
No written agreement that relates to any phase of the affairs of the 
corporation, whether to the management of its business or to the 
division of its profits or otherwise, . . . on the ground that it is an 
attempt by the parties thereto to restrict the discretion of the board of 
directors in its management of the business of the corporation or to 
treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange their 
relationships in a manner that would be appropriate only between 
partners. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006)  
[A]n agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that 
complies with this section is effective among the shareholders and the 
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board management provide an exception for shareholder 
agreements by general reference or express mention.85 Board 
policies (adopted by resolution of the directors) contrary to 
shareholder wealth maximization would seem to have the least 
likely chance of being valid and enforceable because they are not 
mandated or expressly recognized or validated under state 
corporate law statutes—in general or as potential sources of 
varying the board of directors’ authority to manage or direct the 
management of the corporation. A board policy, like any other 
action taken by a corporate board of directors, may be challenged 
on the basis that it violates law or public policy or that it as 
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty 
Based on the foregoing, efforts to formalize legally valid and 
enforceable decision-making guidance for corporate directors—
whether found in the corporation’s charter, bylaws, a shareholder 
agreement, or board policy—that contravenes (de facto or de jure) 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm may or may not be 
successful. Faced with a challenge to firm-level board decision 
making that incorporates significant attention to non-shareholder 
constituencies or non-wealth maximizing corporate objectives 
benefiting or serving shareholders, directors run the risk of 
liability for violating a judicial interpretation of positive law 
(statutory or decisional) or salient public policy. Existing 
commentary suggests that the adjudication of a challenge of this 
kind may result in different outcomes based on the pertinent 
facts.86 For example, corporations organized under the DGCL 
may be treated in a manner that is different from corporations 
organized in MBCA-adopting states. In addition, a public 
                                                                                                     
corporation even though it is inconsistent with one or more other 
provisions of this Act in that it: (1) eliminates the board of directors 
or restricts the discretion or powers of the board of directors; . . . or 
(8) otherwise governs the exercise of the corporate powers or the 
management of the business and affairs of the corporation or the 
relationship among the shareholders, the directors and the 
corporation, or among any of them, and is not contrary to public 
policy. 
 85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (documenting the statutory 
basis for the management authority of the board of directors, including the 
exceptions to the grant of authority). 
 86. See generally Part IV (recognizing the fact-based nature of cases 
shareholder wealth maximization objectives). 
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company or large privately held corporation may be treated 
differently than a statutory close corporation or common law 
closely held corporation in which all shareholders have agreed to 
the adoption of the guidance. The area is fraught with 
uncertainty and unpredictability. 
V. Resulting Implications 
The description and analysis of corporate statutory and 
decisional law and private ordering included in the preceding 
parts of this Essay have many implications for corporate law and 
practice. At its core, this Essay asks fundamental questions about 
the breadth and flexibility of for-profit corporate law in and 
outside Delaware. If directors and officers of firms are obligated 
to act in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation or 
the corporation and its shareholders, what do those obligations 
mean in any individual corporation? How much of the content of 
that “good faith” and “best interest” requires adherence to a 
shareholder wealth maximization norm? How much of that 
content can be defined in corporate charters?  
A determination of the answers to these questions 
necessarily engages debates about ultra vires corporate action 
and the potential role of a duty of obedience in guiding board 
decision-making.87 One goal of projects focusing on these issues 
could be to sort out and optimize the operation of overlapping 
legal doctrine as applied to board decision making and oversight 
in for-profit firms that desire to organize as corporations but do 
not desire to strictly adhere to a shareholder wealth 
maximization norm. The oversight aspect of shareholder wealth 
maximization is often overlooked entirely in discussions about 
corporate management and governance oriented toward the 
interests of multiple constituencies88 since legal actions 
                                                                                                     
 87. See Palmiter, supra note 81 (discussing the potential role for a duty of 
obedience in for-profit corporate law). 
 88. Cf. Olliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1215 
(1984) (discussing firm governance without reference to oversight); William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Watcher, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: 
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 129 (2008) 
(examining Berle’s position on a multiple constituency system without reference 
to oversight). 
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challenging specific board decisions have constituted the principle 
body of judicial opinions on the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm. This understudied aspect of corporate governance deserves 
focused attention. 
Ambiguities about the legal status and overall nature of the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm drive uncertainties in the 
law and its application to director decision making that engage 
the interests of multiple internal and external corporate 
constituencies at the firm level. Is the norm theory, legal 
doctrine, public policy, behavioral guidance, a social rule of 
conduct, or something else altogether? Resolution of this matter 
alone would push analyses further forward. Yet, that resolution is 
unlikely to occur in any definitive way without decisive formal 
legislative or judicial action.  
Moreover, although commentators on the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm most often talk about “wealth” without 
definition, it is clear that many intend to refer to wealth in its 
simple, financial form. Yet some have come to more broadly refer, 
at least in some contexts, to more capacious notions of 
shareholder primacy as a focus for the directors’ management of 
the firm consistent with their fiduciary duties—in other words, 
putting shareholder interests, whether they be financial or other, 
ahead of the interests of other constituencies in overall decision 
making and oversight.89 This notion of shareholder wealth—
really an articulation of shareholder primacy as the objective of 
corporate directors and officer fiduciary duties—would include 
both financial benefit and other value propositions (more a 
matter of shareholder value than shareholder wealth),90 
                                                                                                     
 89. A pair of authors note, along these lines, that: 
[T]here is strong evidence that shareholders sacrifice their financial 
interests to promote their nonfinancial interests. If shareholders do 
not want pure profit maximization, the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm loses much of its theoretical support. The theory 
supporting the norm is largely based on protecting shareholders’ 
interests. If shareholders care about more than just profits, the 
theoretical support for pure profit maximization weakens. 
Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value and the 
Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 41–42 (2015) (footnote 
omitted). 
 90. This distinction also has been noted by others: 
[S]hareholder wealth maximization is distinct from shareholder value 
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presumably as agreed between the shareholders and the firm. 
Broader conceptions of shareholder wealth would be more likely 
to be realizable in board decision making in privately held firms 
and, even more particularly, statutory close or closely held 
corporations. 
The advent of for-profit social enterprise corporations—and 
in particular, the popularity of the benefit corporation—has 
altered the character of the conversation on all these matters—
bringing issues to the fore while (at the same time) adding 
complexity to both descriptive and analytical accounts. While for 
many this complexity may be unwarranted or unwelcomed,91 
benefit corporations may be a proving ground for best practices 
regarding board processes in managing the interests of multiple 
constituencies. For example, litigation involving board decision 
making in benefit corporations may help us to develop a better 
understanding of optimal board processes that take into account 
a more inclusive consideration of constituents. Only time will tell. 
VI. Conclusion 
Is the existence of a shareholder wealth maximization norm, 
then, a simplistic, reductionist account or doctrinal truth? The 
evidence to date is inconclusive. No doubt, as Delaware Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Leo Strine repeated a number of times at the 
                                                                                                     
maximization. Shareholders may value things other than wealth, 
which necessarily implies a balance of interests. When making a 
decision, the costs and benefits are calculated for various effects, e.g., 
how will it affect profits, employee happiness or air quality. Under 
shareholder value maximization, these outputs are weighed and a 
course of action is selected that best improves the shareholders’ total 
well-being. Under shareholder wealth maximization, all outputs 
except profits are ignored, and the course of action that maximizes 
profits is selected. In other words, maximizing for shareholder 
interests will reach the same result as shareholder wealth 
maximization if and only if the shareholders place zero value on every 
consequence but wealth. 
Id. at 45 (emphasis added). 
 91. See, e.g., Kennan Khatib, Comment, The Harms of the Benefit 
Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 174 (2015) (observing that, “[i]nstead of 
wading through the murky waters, advocates of the benefit corporation have 
preyed on the fears of social entrepreneurs to help solidify the new corporate 
form”). 
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symposium at which the ideas for this Essay were presented, 
directors cannot “do whatever they want.”92 But the extent to 
which directors must observe a shareholder wealth management 
norm in their management of the corporation for the short term 
and the long term in a fashion consistent with applicable 
fiduciary duties remains relatively untested. Moreover, the extent 
to which shareholders can limit or otherwise define the existence 
and nature of a shareholder wealth maximization norm at the 
firm level in a manner that is both valid and enforceable is also 
substantially unproven.  
Given differences in doctrine and public policy among the 
states and variance in that doctrine and public policy among 
public, private, and statutory close or closely held corporations 
within individual states, answers to these many open questions 
are likely to (and should) depend on individualized facts assessed 
through the lens of specific statutory and decisional law and 
applicable public policy. As a court of equity sitting in the state 
that has a clear leadership position in U.S. corporate law, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery is likely to be a proving ground for 
many of these cases. In this author’s mind, however, there is no 
doubt that the Chancery Court’s opinion in the eBay litigation is 
not the end of the story in Delaware—or elsewhere. 
                                                                                                     
 92. Chief Justice Leo Strine, Address at the Washington and Lee Law 
Review Symposium: Corporate Law, Governance, and Purpose: A Tribute to the 
Scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon (Oct. 21–22, 2016). 
